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A NEO-CHICAGO APPROACH TO
CONCERTED ACTION
WILLIAM H. PAGE*
To state a claim under Section 1 of the Sherman Act1 for concerted action2
like price fixing or market allocation, plaintiffs must now plead “enough fac-
tual matter (taken as true) to suggest that an agreement was made.”3 It is not
enough for the complaint to allege, for example, that the defendants charged
identical prices and that they “conspired” to do so.4 Even if they meet the
pleading standard, plaintiffs will suffer summary judgment if they fail to pro-
duce evidence that “tend[s] to exclude the possibility that the defendants
merely were engaged in lawful conscious parallelism.”5 Meeting these bur-
dens of pleading and production is challenging because it is not clear what
distinguishes concerted from consciously parallel action as a matter of law or
fact:6 the legal definition of concerted action is vague; and economics, which
* Marshall M. Criser Eminent Scholar and Associate Dean for Faculty Development, Univer-
sity of Florida Levin College of Law. I thank Joseph Harrington and Paolo Buccirossi for com-
ments and Kimberly Stewart for research assistance.
1 15 U.S.C. § 1 (“Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspir-
acy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby
declared to be illegal.”).
2 In re Baby Food Antitrust Litig., 166 F.3d 112, 117 n.3 (3d Cir. 1999) (“The phrase ‘con-
certed action’ is often used as shorthand for any form of activity meeting the Section 1 ‘contract
. . . combination or conspiracy’ requirement.”).
3 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556–57 (2007). See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678–80 (2009).
4 See, e.g., Kendall v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 518 F.3d 1042, 1048 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding insuffi-
cient allegations that banks conspired to follow interchange fees set by a credit card company).
5 City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chems., Inc., 158 F.3d 548, 571–72 (11th Cir. 1998). See
also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986) (holding that
“[t]o survive a motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict, a plaintiff seeking dam-
ages for a violation of § 1 must present evidence ‘that tends to exclude the possibility’ that the
alleged conspirators acted independently”).
6 William H. Page, The Gary Dinners and the Meaning of Concerted Action, 62 SMU L.
REV. 597 (2009) [hereinafter Gary Dinners]; William H. Page, Facilitating Practices and Con-
certed Action Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, in ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS 23
(Keith Hylton ed., 2010) [hereinafter Facilitating Practices]; William H. Page, Twombly and
Communication: The Emerging Definition of Concerted Action Under the New Pleading Stan-
dards, 5 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 439, 468 (2009) [hereinafter Twombly]; William H. Page,
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guides antitrust decision making in other contexts, has not resolved some of
the most basic issues that the law poses. To make matters worse, the most
persuasive evidence of collusion is typically hidden.7
In this article, I offer an approach to concerted action that builds on tradi-
tional Chicago School analyses of the issue8 but adds a requirement that rivals
communicate in specified ways. Chicago scholars uniformly identify cartels
as the primary target of antitrust enforcement. They have also established
much of the framework within which courts and economists analyze con-
certed action. George Stigler’s seminal theory of oligopoly,9 which sought to
identify the determinants of effective collusion, has spawned an enormous
literature in game theory that models the pricing behavior of oligopolists.10
Richard Posner extended Stigler’s analysis to the domain of law and policy.11
His approach to oligopoly drew on both economic theory and evidence to
identify structural and behavioral characteristics of markets that suggested the
presence of noncompetitive pricing. He also argued that tacit collusion—ri-
vals’ coordination of noncompetitive pricing without express communica-
tion—could satisfy the Sherman Act’s requirement of agreement. But
Posner’s legal treatment of tacit collusion has not persuaded the courts.12
I argue that Posner’s approach to the problem of oligopoly, refocused on
the role of communication, provides the most promising way forward in the
analysis of concerted action. After recounting the history of the Chicago
Communication and Concerted Action, 37 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 405, 411–12 (2007) [hereinafter
Communication].
7 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, PROOF OF CONSPIRACY UNDER THE FEDERAL ANTI-
TRUST LAWS 53 n.9 (2010) (collecting cases noting the difficulty of discovering direct proof of
conspiracy).
8 For discussion of the nature and influence of the Chicago School, see William H. Page, The
Chicago School and the Evolution of Antitrust: Characterization, Antitrust Injury, and Eviden-
tiary Sufficiency, 75 VA. L. REV. 1221, 1233–37 (1989).
9 GEORGE J. STIGLER, A Theory of Oligopoly, in THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 39 (1968).
10 Guy Sagi, The Oligopolistic Pricing Problem: A Suggested Price Freeze Remedy, 2008
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 269, 272–73 (observing that “Stigler’s influential cooperative model . . . in
many ways changed the way we look at oligopoly pricing and laid the groundwork for some of
the modern dynamic game theoretic models.”). For introductions, see W. KIP VISCUSI, JOHN M.
VERNON & JOSEPH E. HARRINGTON, JR., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 106–28
(4th ed. 2005); DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZA-
TION ch. 6 (4th ed. 2005).
11 Richard A Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21 STAN. L.
REV. 1562, 1598–1605 (1968) [hereinafter Oligopoly].
12 Id. at 1575–93; see also In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651, 654
(7th Cir. 2002) (Posner, J.) (suggesting, consistent with his theory of oligopoly, that if “a firm
raises price in the expectation that its competitors will do likewise, and they do, the firm’s behav-
ior can be conceptualized as the offer of a unilateral contract that the offerees accept by raising
their prices,” but recognizing that “it is generally believed . . . that an express, manifested agree-
ment, and thus an agreement involving actual, verbalized communication, must be proved in
order for a price-fixing conspiracy to be actionable under the Sherman Act”).
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1782896
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School’s analysis of collusion, focusing on the pioneering efforts of Stigler
and Posner, in the remainder of the article, I redefine concerted action and
suggest how enforcers might find it. My proposal is both normative and posi-
tive: it develops a policy position drawing on the economic literature but also
reconciles the position with the federal courts’ emerging approach to the issue
of agreement in various contexts.
In Part II, I argue that Section 1 does not reach tacit collusion, but neither
does it require an explicit verbal agreement; instead, interdependent actions
are concerted if rivals coordinate them, in part, by private communication. I
argue that this focus on communicative concerted action is consistent with the
Chicago tradition, particularly error cost analysis. The Neo-Chicago character
of my approach lies in its reliance on recent economic literature on the role of
communication in collusion. In Part III, I examine a small but important sub-
set of that literature: studies of how real-world cartels use both communica-
tion and facilitating practices to achieve their aims. Based on these studies, I
suggest how plaintiffs and enforcement agencies might discover concerted ac-
tion by examining changing patterns in the use of facilitating practices, which
could likely be achieved only through private communication.
I. CHICAGO, OLIGOPOLY, AND TACIT COLLUSION
The Chicago School is most often associated with its critique of antitrust
law’s traditional treatment of resale price maintenance13 and exclusionary
practices like tying14 and predatory pricing.15 But the Chicago School has also
produced a characteristic analysis of cartels. Its fundamental criterion of anti-
trust policy is consumer welfare. For most Chicagoans, cartels offer the para-
digmatic demonstration of how a collusive practice can reduce consumer
welfare by restricting output and destroying the surplus value consumers place
on lost production.16 In their seminal statement of the Chicago School’s ap-
proach,17 Aaron Director and Edward Levi observe that “[t]he problem of col-
lusion has always been central to the antitrust laws,”18 because if “a price-
fixing agreement occurs between members of an industry controlling a sub-
stantial share of the market . . . the consequences of this behavior may be
13 Lester G. Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. & ECON. 86 (1960).
14 Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19
(1957).
15 John S. McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, 1 J.L. & ECON. 137
(1958).
16 ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 263 (1978)
(“The subject of cartels lies at the center of antitrust policy.”).
17 Aaron Director & Edward H. Levi, Law and the Future: Trade Regulation, 51 NW. U. L.
REV. 281 (1956).
18 Id. at 294.
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predicted with some certainty.”19 Cartels raise prices to consumers and trans-
fer wealth from them to producers, but the traditional economic concern has
been that they generate deadweight social welfare losses, measured by the
reduction in consumer surplus.20 More controversially, Posner has argued that
the social cost of cartels may be higher than the deadweight welfare loss, if
firms engage in socially wasteful non-price competition or costly exclusionary
activities that dissipate their monopoly profit.21
Chicagoans have generally agreed that explicit cartels should be per se un-
lawful. Robert Bork showed that Congress was concerned with the problem of
cartels, particularly those formed by railroads, in enacting Section 1 of the
Sherman Act.22 Director and Levi argue that “there is an economic foundation
for the illegality of price fixing in itself when market price is affected,” both
because of the clear harm to consumers and the ease of administering the
rule.23 Posner made “horizontal combinations” the centerpiece of his “pro-
gram for the Antitrust Division,” arguing that it was the only target endorsed
by a consensus of economists.24 Frank Easterbrook suggests that the Chicago
School “favor[s] little other than prosecuting plain vanilla cartels and mergers
to monopoly” because its members are “reasonably sure that these two things
are harmful to consumers (though there are scattered doubters).”25
Chicago scholars have recognized, however, that despite the attractions of
cartel profits, we do not observe cartels everywhere because forming and op-
erating a cartel is hard, even apart from legal sanctions. As Director and Levi
19 Id. at 294–95.
20 BORK, supra note 16, at 108. But cf. Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and
Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65
(1982).
21 Richard A. Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. POL. ECON. 807,
820 (1975) (estimating the social costs of private cartels under various assumptions).
22 Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & ECON. 7, 21
(1966) (arguing that “Congress intended to outlaw ‘loose combinations’ of the sort typified by
price-fixing and market division agreements between competitors.”). See also HANS B.
THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: ORIGINATION OF AN AMERICAN TRADITION 72–85
(1954) (documenting congressional concern with both close-knit and loose-knit combinations).
23 Director & Levi, supra note 17, at 294–95.
24 Richard A. Posner, A Program for the Antitrust Division, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 500, 508
(1971) [hereinafter A Program].
25 Frank H. Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1696, 1701 (1986). The
principal doubter is Lester Telser, who has argued that agreements among rivals to coordinate
production may sometimes be necessary to respond efficiently to shifts in demand. LESTER G.
TELSER, A THEORY OF EFFICIENT COOPERATION AND COMPETITION (1987); Lester G. Telser,
Cooperation, Competition, and Efficiency, 28 J.L. & ECON. 271, 290 (1985) [hereinafter Cooper-
ation]. For criticism of Telser’s argument, see John S. Wiley, Jr., Antitrust and Core Theory, 54
U. CHI. L. REV. 556 (1987); see also Fred S. McChesney, Be True to Your School: Chicago’s
Contradictory Views of Antitrust and Regulation, in THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF ANTI-
TRUST: THE PUBLIC-CHOICE PERSPECTIVE 323 (Fred S. McChesney & William F. Shughart II
eds., 1995) (arguing that, despite its stated rationale, antitrust is driven by private interests).
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put it, “[P]rice-fixing agreements, when adherence to them cannot be com-
pelled through coercion or penalties, might be self-correcting either through
the defection of members, which would be rewarding to the individual firm,
or through the advent of new firms.”26 Similarly, Lester Telser notes that car-
tels must not only set a profit-maximizing price, but also control the tempta-
tion to cheat; since they evidently do not always succeed in these functions
“we need a theory to find [the] conditions” in which they can.27
Stigler was the first Chicago economist to examine this issue systemati-
cally.28 His famous theory of oligopoly is actually a theory of “the feasibility
of collusion,”29 defined in purely economic terms as the “joint determination
of outputs and prices by ostensibly independent firms.”30 In order to account
for heterogeneity of both products and buyers, he observes, collusive oligo-
polists usually must achieve “a price structure of some complexity” that takes
account of differences in the costs of transactions, entry barriers, and demand
elasticity.31 Moreover, the cartel must account for the incentive of members of
the cartel to increase their individual profits by secret price cuts. Conse-
quently, “collusion is impossible for many firms,” but can be “much more
effective” when market conditions, like high concentration on the selling side,
low concentration on the buying side, and homogeneous products, allow firms
to detect and penalize secret price cutting32 by, for example, monitoring rivals’
shifts in sales.33 In examining the empirical literature, Stigler finds that “the
less perfect the market knowledge, the more extensive the price cutting”34 that
undermines the collusive understanding.
Stigler’s theory does not address the legal problems of definition, character-
ization, and proof that attend the decision to ban cartels. Director and Levi
note, however, that the “serious problem of collusion is to determine what
conduct is to be characterized as the equivalent of an agreement to control
output.”35 Condemning trade associations’ dissemination of information, for
example, would be problematic because “relative merits of knowledge and
ignorance are not well defined in legal or economic doctrine.”36 Just as in-
creasing firm size may bring both scale economies and market power, dissem-
26 Director & Levi, supra note 17, at 294. See also Posner, A Program, supra note 24, at 529
(“The cartel . . . carries within it the seeds of its own destruction.”).
27 LESTER G. TELSER, COMPETITION, COLLUSION, AND GAME THEORY 178 (1972).
28 STIGLER, supra note 9, at 39.
29 Id. at 40.
30 Id. at 41.
31 Id. at 41–42.
32 Id. at 39, 42.
33 Id. at 44–45.
34 Id. at 59.
35 Director & Levi, supra note 17, at 295.
36 Id.
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ination of information may bring either an “improvement of the market” or “a
restriction in output in the industry,” depending upon each firm’s “prediction
. . . of the behavior of other firms in the industry.”37 Stating the legal problem
of conscious parallelism with prescience, Director and Levi caution that
courts should not “assume that action taken on general knowledge implies a
concert of action equivalent to collusion, conspiracy or agreement, and yet the
result may be the same as that which follows from an agreement.”38
Bork similarly would limit the prohibition of collusion to cases of “explicit
and detectable agreement.”39 He does not insist on direct evidence of the
agreement because “[t]here may be evidence of market behavior that is con-
sistent only with collusion, and that may of course be used to show
agreement.”40
Despite the reservations of other Chicagoans, Posner, beginning in 1968,
has built on Stigler’s theory of collusive oligopoly to argue that, where rivals
are able to overcome the costs of coordination and enforcement by “tacit col-
lusion,” their actions should violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act.41 He distin-
guishes his idea of tacit collusion from the theory of “oligopolistic
interdependence,” in which firms make individual choices to price at noncom-
petitive levels by independently recognizing their joint self-interest.42 Oligop-
oly, Posner argues, is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for
noncompetitive pricing.43 Oligopolists must choose not to price at marginal
cost and instead to restrict output and raise prices along with their rivals, and
to undertake the costly business of determining, coordinating, and enforcing
37 Id. at 295–96.
38 Id. at 296.
39 BORK, supra note 16, at 175. See also id. at 103–04 (describing the theory of oligopolistic
interdependence as “speculation about how firms may or may not be able to behave”).
40 Id.
41 Posner, Oligopoly, supra note 11. Posner has refined his policy analysis over several de-
cades. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 51–100 (2d ed. 2001). In his judicial capacity,
he recognizes that the law is not consistent with his normative analysis. In re High Fructose Corn
Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651, 654 (7th Cir. 2002). Louis Kaplow has recently argued
along the same lines that the core of the agreement requirement is interdependence or “behavior
that involves coordination with others,” not various mechanisms for achieving it, like communi-
cation. See Louis Kaplow, On the Meaning of Horizontal Agreements in Competition Law, 99
CALIF. L. REV. 683, 697 (2011) [hereinafter Horizontal Agreements]. Kaplow, however, stops
short of advocating as a legal rule that courts should equate interdependence and agreement. Id.
at 689, 814. See also Louis Kaplow, An Economic Approach to Price Fixing, 77 ANTITRUST L.J.
343, 348–49 (2011) (also criticizing the focus on communication, but declining to propose a
legal standard) [hereinafter Economic Approach].
42 POSNER, supra note 41, at 55–60. For expressions of the interdependence theory, see Don-
ald F. Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and
Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV. 655, 665–66 (1962); JOE S. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZA-
TION 114 (2d ed. 1968).
43 Posner, Oligopoly, supra note 11, at 1571.
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the higher prices.44 In raising prices above the competitive level, a firm makes
a kind of offer that its rivals accept by following suit, in the process reaching a
“meeting of the minds” that satisfies the literal language of the statute.45 Pos-
ner evidently views this choice as a culpable act worthy of antitrust sanctions.
Because tacit collusion is always anticompetitive, Posner suggests, it is a
more appropriate target than a pure price-fixing conspiracy, which may reflect
only “the attempt to fix prices.”46 Attempts may have “negligible conse-
quences, while much serious price fixing may escape detection altogether be-
cause detectable overt communication is necessary for proof of an attempt but
is not always necessary to bring about a concerted increase of price.”47 Posner
concedes that “it seems improbable that prices could long be maintained
above cost in a market, even a highly oligopolistic one, without some explicit
acts of communication and implementation.”48 He also concedes that he
harbors doubt that identifying industries in which tacit collusion is likely and
actually occurring “is fully practicable in the present state of economic knowl-
edge.”49 Moreover, he recognizes that the courts’ track record in finding collu-
sion in the absence of evidence of communication has not inspired
confidence. Nevertheless, he suggests that “[e]conomically significant collu-
sion should leave some visible traces in the pricing behavior of the market,
even granting fully the interpretive difficulties that such behavior presents.”50
In his first article on this subject, Posner points to systematic price discrimi-
nation (measured by the ratio of price to marginal cost), excess capacity, in-
frequent changes in transaction prices, stable market shares over time,
identical sealed bidding, refusal to discount prices despite excess capacity,
and price preannouncements51 as suspicious behavior. In later writings, he
proposes that public enforcement agencies identify industries that are structur-
ally predisposed to price fixing (for example, oligopolies selling homogene-
ous products to numerous buyers), and then look for telltale economic
evidence that price fixing, tacit or express, was actually occurring,52 including
the presence of “facilitating practices” that make it easier for firms to coordi-
44 Id. at 1572.
45 Id. at 1576. POSNER, supra note 41, at 94–95.
46 Posner, A Program, supra note 24, at 514.
47 POSNER, supra note 41, at 53. He adds that “[f]rom an economic standpoint it is a detail
whether the collusive pricing scheme was organized and implemented in such a way as to gener-
ate evidence of actual communications.” Id. at 94.
48 Posner, Oligopoly, supra note 11, at 1574.
49 Posner, A Program, supra note 24, at 515.
50 Posner, Oligopoly, supra note 11, at 1587.
51 Id. at 1579–83. Posner suggests that price leadership may be legitimate if based on defer-
ence to one firm’s judgment of market conditions, but not if it is “so uniform and long-continued
as to warrant an inference of tacit collusion.” Id. at 1582.
52 Posner, A Program, supra note 24, at 515.
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nate and enforce price and output decisions.53 The category of facilitating
practices now includes systems for reporting transaction prices,54 most fa-
vored customer clauses,55 meeting competition clauses,56 delivered or basing
point pricing,57 industry-wide resale price maintenance,58 and public price an-
nouncements.59 Posner suggests that, where practices like these do facilitate
price coordination, courts should in some cases hold firms liable for tacit col-
lusion.60 Where the firms in the market have adopted a facilitating practice
that makes price coordination possible, the courts can remedy the noncompet-
itive behavior by enjoining the use of the practice.61
II. COMMUNICATIVE CONCERTED ACTION:
THE COURTS AND ERROR COSTS
Despite his frequent iconoclasm, Judge Posner is the most influential mem-
ber of the Chicago School, and his analysis of tacit collusion is one of his
most famous policy positions. It is part of the Chicago tradition because it
builds on Stigler’s classic analysis of collusive oligopoly to formulate both a
53 POSNER, supra note 41, at 97–98.
54 Christopher R. Leslie, Trust, Distrust, and Antitrust, 82 TEX. L. REV. 515, 575–76 (2004).
55 William S. Neilson & Harold Winter, Bilateral Most-Favored-Customer Pricing and Collu-
sion, 24 RAND J. ECON. 147 (1993); Jonathan B. Baker, Vertical Restraints with Horizontal
Consequences: Competitive Effects of Most-Favored-Customer Clauses, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 597
(1996).
56 Steven C. Salop, Practices that (Credibly) Facilitate Oligopoly Co-ordination, in NEW DE-
VELOPMENTS IN THE ANALYSIS OF MARKET STRUCTURE 265, 279–82 (Joseph E. Stiglitz & G.
Frank Mathewson eds., 1986).
57 Maria Paz Espinosa, Delivered Pricing, FOB Pricing, and Collusion in Spatial Markets, 23
RAND J. ECON. 64 (1992); Toshihiro Matsumura & Noriaki Matsushima, Cartel Stability in a
Delivered Pricing Oligopoly, 86 J. ECON. 259 (2005); Fred S. McChesney & William F.
Shughart II, Delivered Pricing in Theory and Policy Practice, 52 ANTITRUST BULL. 205 (2007);
GEORGE J. STIGLER, A Theory of Delivered Price Systems, in THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY
147 (1968).
58 POSNER, supra note 41, at 88–89; Telser, supra note 13, at 99–104.
59 Michael D. Blechman, Conscious Parallelism, Signaling and Facilitating Devices: The
Problem of Tacit Collusion Under the Antitrust Laws, 24 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 881 (1979);
Charles A. Holt & David T. Scheffman, Facilitating Practices: The Effects of Advance Notice
and Best-Price Policies, 18 RAND J. ECON. 187 (1987); Joseph Kattan, Beyond Facilitating
Practices: Price Signaling and Price Protection Clauses in the New Antitrust Environment, 63
ANTITRUST L.J. 133 (1994); Julio J. Rotemberg & Garth Saloner, Collusive Price Leadership, 39
J. INDUS. ECON. 93 (1990); W. Bentley MacLeod, A Theory of Conscious Parallelism, 27 EUR.
ECON. REV. 25 (1985).
60 See also Paolo Buccirossi, Facilitating Practices, in HANDBOOK OF ANTITRUST ECONOMICS
305, 341–43 (Paolo Buccirossi ed., 2008). Buccirossi argues that facilitating practices may vio-
late Section 1 if they are accompanied by “two-way, pre-play communication” that coordinates
behavior and may violate Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act if the facilitating
practice is only unilaterally adopted by one firm and matched by rivals.
61 POSNER, supra note 41, at 98–99. Donald Turner, who otherwise believed tacit collusion to
be beyond the reach of Section 1, agreed with Posner on this point. See Turner, supra note 42, at
675–76.
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legal standard and practical enforcement recommendations. His application of
the analysis to mergers provided the groundwork for the enforcement agen-
cies’ Horizontal Merger Guidelines, which have transformed the law of Sec-
tion 7 of the Clayton Act.62 As a proposal for interpretation and enforcement
of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, however, Posner’s recommendation has not
succeeded. In this Part, I argue that concerted action requires communication,
and that this interpretation of concerted action is an appropriate extension of
the Chicago tradition given our present state of knowledge.
A. CONCERTED ACTION IN THE COURTS
Posner’s approach to tacit collusion and his focus on facilitating practices
initially won over the enforcement agencies. Both the Antitrust Division of
the U.S. Department of Justice63 and the Federal Trade Commission64 under-
took campaigns against tacit collusion (or shared monopoly) in the late 1970s
and early 1980s, but both ended without a victory in court. In the Ethyl case,
for example, the FTC presented the court with a market almost perfectly
structured for noncompetitive pricing.65 The court nevertheless declined to
find liability based on the presence of three facilitating practices because each
of them served benign purposes that purchasers wanted; all had, in fact, been
adopted when there was a single firm in the market, so they must have served
62 See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines 24–25
(2010) (stating that “[p]arallel accommodating conduct includes situations in which each rival’s
response to competitive moves made by others is individually rational, and not motivated by
retaliation or deterrence nor intended to sustain an agreed-upon market outcome, but nevertheless
emboldens price increases and weakens competitive incentives to reduce prices or offer custom-
ers better terms”), available at http://ftc.gov/os/2010/08/100819hmg.pdf.
63 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Division Memorandum on Identification and Challenge of
Parallel Pricing Practices in Concentrated Industries, [July–Dec.] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep.
(BNA) No. 874, at F-1 (May 26, 1978). For discussion, see George A. Hay, Oligopoly, Shared
Monopoly, and Antitrust Law, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 439 (1982); Gregory J. Werden, Price Fixing
and Civil Damages: Setting the Record Straight, 34 ANTITRUST BULL. 307, 334 n.84 (1989).
64 E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1984) (Ethyl), vacating Ethyl
Corp. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 101 F.T.C. 425 (1983). For discussion of the FTC’s
decision in the case, see Donald S. Clark, Price-Fixing Without Collusion: An Analysis of Facili-
tating Practices After Ethyl Corp., 1983 WIS. L. REV. 887; see also Lee Goldman, Oligopoly
Policy and the Ethyl Corp. Case, 65 OR. L. REV. 73 (1986); David M. Grether & Charles R.
Plott, The Effects of Market Practices in Oligopolistic Markets: An Experimental Examination of
the Ethyl Case, 22 ECON. INQUIRY 479 (1984); George A. Hay, Facilitating Practices: The Ethyl
Case, in THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION 182 (John E. Kwoka Jr. & Lawrence J. White eds., 3d ed.
1999); Michael G. Vita, Fifteen Years After Ethyl: The Past and Future of Facilitating Practices,
68 ANTITRUST L.J. 991 (2001).
65 Ethyl, 729 F.2d at 132 (“These characteristics of the industry—high concentration, small
likelihood of new entries because of a sharply declining market, inelastic demand, and homoge-
neity of product—led to a natural oligopoly with a high degree of pricing interdependence in
which there was far less incentive to engage in price competition than if there had been many
sellers in an expanding market.”).
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functions other than (or in addition to) price coordination.66 Thus, uniform
adoption of a facilitating practice does not, by itself, permit an inference of
concerted action.67 As a later court observed, “‘facilitating devices’ are not
necessarily sufficient under the law to constitute a ‘plus factor’”68 that would
raise a jury issue of agreement, because they typically serve benign functions.
Nor are allegations of facilitating practices necessarily sufficient to raise a
plausible inference of concerted action to avoid dismissal under Twombly,
which requires that “when allegations of parallel conduct are set out in order
to make a § 1 claim, they must be placed in a context that raises a suggestion
of a preceding agreement, not merely parallel conduct that could just as well
be independent action.”69
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Leegin,70 applying the rule of rea-
son to resale price maintenance, illustrates the point.71 Industry-wide resale
price maintenance is a facilitating practice because it makes it harder for
members of a manufacturers’ cartel to cheat by offering secret discounts to
retailers.72 Some have therefore suggested that manufacturers’ parallel adop-
tion of resale price maintenance is a sufficient basis for inference of a hori-
zontal agreement among the manufacturers.73 In Leegin, however, the Court
suggested only that resale price maintenance “should be subject to more care-
ful scrutiny . . . if many competing manufacturers adopt the practice”74 and
that it is sometimes “useful evidence for a plaintiff attempting to prove the
existence of a horizontal cartel.”75 Rivals might use resale price maintenance
to police a cartel by “identifying price-cutting manufacturers.”76 In that case, it
would “facilitate” a per se illegal cartel and thus itself be “unlawful under the
rule of reason.”77 But manufacturers might also maintain resale prices to pre-
vent no-frills retailers from free riding on the promotional activities of full-
66 See, e.g., id. at 133 (“There is no evidence that the practice was adopted by any of the
respondents for other than legitimate business reasons, the principal of which were tradition and
customer demand.”).
67 Posner has criticized the decision, without addressing the issue of the benefits of the prac-
tices. POSNER, supra note 41, at 98.
68 Williamson Oil Co. v. Philip Morris Cos., 231 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1274–75 (N.D. Ga. 2002),
aff’d, 346 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2003).
69 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007). See, e.g., In re Ins. Brokerage
Antitrust Litig., 618 F. 3d 300, 334–35 (3d Cir. 2010).
70 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
71 Page, Facilitating Practices, supra note 6, at 33–34.
72 POSNER, supra note 41, at 88–89.
73 See, e.g., Turner, supra note 42, at 678–81 (arguing that it is “an unlawful agreement for
oligopolists to make interdependent decisions to adopt fair trade, regardless of the means
employed”).
74 Leegin, 551 U.S. at 897.
75 Id. at 893.
76 Id. at 892.
77 Id. at 893.
2012] A NEO-CHICAGO APPROACH TO CONCERTED ACTION 183
service retailers.78 Thus, as Posner has observed, “the fact that competing sell-
ers engage in resale price maintenance is an ambiguous sign of cartelization; it
may mean only that each of the sellers in the industry has decided that his
own ends would be furthered by controlling the resale price of the product.”79
Consequently, parallel adoption of a facilitating practice, by itself, cannot
justify an inference of a price-fixing agreement. Because the practice will in-
variably involve some consumer benefit, parallel adoption of it does not tend
to exclude the possibility that each firm is acting independently. I am speak-
ing here only of parallel use of facilitating practices—an express agreement to
standardize pricing in a way that facilitates price coordination is illegal per
se.80
We now know that tacit collusion alone is not an illegal agreement,81 but
we still do not know what kind of coordination is an agreement.82 The Su-
preme Court has offered, unhelpfully, that no “formal,83 “explicit,”84 or “ex-
press”85 agreement is needed so long as the defendants have “a unity of
purpose or a common design and understanding, or a meeting of the minds”86
78 Id. at 890.
79 POSNER, supra note 41, at 88–89.
80 See, e.g., Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 649–50 (1980); Sugar Inst., Inc.
v. United States, 297 U.S. 553 (1936). For discussion, see Robert H. Lande & Howard P. Marvel,
The Three Types of Collusion: Fixing Prices, Rivals, and Rules, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 941, 945–46
(2000); see also Page, Facilitating Practices, supra note 6, at 30–32. I have argued elsewhere
that a state statute that mandates the adoption of a facilitating practice should be preempted by
the Sherman Act. John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, State Action and the Meaning of Agree-
ment Under the Sherman Act: An Approach to Hybrid Restraints, 20 YALE J. ON REG. 269,
294–97 (2003).  See also Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Maleng, 522 F.3d 874, 901–04 (9th Cir.
2008); TFWS, Inc. v. Schaefer, 242 F.3d 198 (4th Cir. 2001); Miller v. Hedlund, 813 F.2d 1344,
1350 (9th Cir. 1986).
81 Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 227 (1993) (“Tacit
collusion, sometimes called oligopolistic price coordination or conscious parallelism, describes
the process, not in itself unlawful, by which firms in a concentrated market might in effect share
monopoly power, setting their prices at a profit-maximizing, supracompetitive level by recogniz-
ing their shared economic interests and their interdependence with respect to price and output
decisions.”) This language would appear to supersede any contrary inference from the Court’s
reference in Theatre Enterprises to “an agreement, tacit or express.” Theatre Enters., Inc. v.
Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 540 (1954). Courts, however, continue to use
similar terms in a confusing way. See, e.g., White v. R.M. Packer Co., 635 F.3d 571, 576 n.3 (1st
Cir. 2011) (distinguishing lawful tacit collusion from unlawful tacit agreement). Cf. Kaplow,
Horizontal Agreements, supra note 41, at 726 (criticizing courts and commentators for impreci-
sion in language describing various forms of interdependence).
82 Cf. United States v. Ashland-Warren, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 433, 442 (M.D. Tenn. 1982) (“The
concept of ‘agreement’ is elusive.”).
83 Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 809 (1946)
84 United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 142–43 (1966).
85 United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 142 (1948) (noting that “[i]t is
enough that a concert of action is contemplated and that the defendants conformed to the
arrangement”).
86 American Tobacco, 328 U.S. at 810.
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or “conscious commitment to a common scheme.”87 All of these terms are
consistent with lawful tacit collusion.88 William Kovacic reads the Court’s
opinions to hold that firms may form an agreement by “means other than a
direct exchange of assurances,”89 but it is unclear what those means might be.
B. COMMUNICATIVE CONCERTED ACTION
I argue in this section that consciously parallel conduct becomes concerted
if rivals achieve it, at least in part, by communicating their intended actions
and their reliance on others’ actions.90 To distinguish concerted conduct from
facilitating practices with ambiguous purposes, I limit communications to pri-
vate oral or written communications as opposed to public price announce-
ments.91 For the same reason, I also limit communications to those involving
competitive intention and reliance rather than communication of facts like
prices.92 Concerted action in this sense—what might be called communicative
concerted action—requires more than purely tacit collusion, but does not re-
quire a “direct exchange of assurances.” It thus does not require a completed
verbal agreement on prices. Nor does it require direct proof of communica-
87 Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 768 (1984).
88 Kaplow, Horizontal Agreements, supra note 41, at 699–700.
89 William E. Kovacic, Antitrust Policy and Horizontal Collusion in the 21st Century, 9 LOY.
CONSUMER L. REV. 97, 100 (1997).
90 This argument builds on OLIVER BLACK, CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF ANTITRUST
185–87 (2005). See Page, Gary Dinners, supra note 6; Page, Communication, supra note 6;
Page, Twombly, supra note 6; see also Kaplow, Horizontal Agreements, supra note 41, at 701
n.24 (collecting legal and economic commentators who advocate a focus on communication in
defining illegal concerted action).
91 Dennis W. Carlton, Robert H. Gertner & Andrew M. Rosenfield, Communication Among
Competitors: Game Theory and Antitrust, 5 GEO. MASON L. REV. 423, 426–28 (1997) (distin-
guishing direct exchange of information through communications among competitors with the
more likely procompetitive indirect communication through price announcements).  But see
Kaplow, Horizontal Agreements, supra note 41, at 712–14 (arguing that any attempt to distin-
guish a subset of communications as decisive in the formation of an agreement is doomed be-
cause of the ease with which firms can substitute other methods of coordination); id. at 797–803
(arguing that oligopoly theory suggests that communication may have various roles in achieving
agreement, but is not its distinguishing characteristic); Joseph E. Harrington, Posted Pricing as a
Plus Factor, 7 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 1, 19 (2011) (arguing that public posted pricing may
function as communication sufficient to establish concerted action if “the signal’s content is
clear”).
92 Joseph E. Harrington, Jr. & Wei Zhao, Signaling and Tacit Collusion in an Infinitely Re-
peated Prisoners’ Dilemma 20–21 (Aug. 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (distinguishing ex-
changes of information and intentions), available at http://www.econ.jhu.edu/People/Harrington/
tacit%20collusion%20PD_5.11.pdf. Exchanges of current prices may justify an inference of an
agreement to exchange prices, which might itself be unlawful under the rule of reason if it is
proven to have an anticompetitive effect. United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333,
334–35 (1969). I am concerned here with inference of concerted action with respect to future
prices, which triggers per se illegality. In some factual contexts, an exchange of current prices
might be interpreted as expression of intent concerning future prices.
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tion, if circumstantial evidence allows the inference that the requisite commu-
nications occurred.
This focus on expressions of intention in a pattern of interdependent behav-
ior is not new to American antitrust law. In at least two instances, fifty years
apart, federal courts have explicitly distinguished communicative concerted
action from tacit collusion on the one hand and from completed verbal agree-
ments on the other. The distinctions appear first in the district court’s analysis
of the famous Gary Dinners in the United States Steel case in 1915, which the
Supreme Court affirmed93 five years later.94 The district court panel first held
that the steel manufacturers’ parallel identical pricing of standard steel rails
for over a decade was lawful, because the rivals “simply followed that basic
price to prevent the ruinous rail wars of the past.”95 As the former president of
U.S. Steel explained:
[I]f I were to vary that price of $28 for rails, which seems to have been
recognized by all rail manufacturers as a fair price and giving a fair profit, if
I were to vary that 10 cents a ton, I would precipitate a steel war . . . that
would result in ruining my works without any profit. Everybody by tacit and
mutual understanding felt the same about that.96
The court concluded that this sort of tacit collusion was lawful.
In contrast, the Gary Dinners and the associated subcommittee meetings of
producers of various steel products were illegal, because they involved state-
ments of intention by rivals that had a demonstrable effect on prices:
At neither [the dinners nor the meetings] were agreements made concerning
prices at which the participants would sell their products. In fact, it was
asserted and reasserted that such agreements were impossible, because ille-
gal; but in lieu of agreements, the parties, both at the dinners and at the
committee meetings, severally made what they chose to call “declarations of
purpose”—that is, declarations of the prices at which they respectively pro-
posed to sell their products, to which prices it is testified all adhered until
some one chose to deviate therefrom, in which event he was “in decency”
bound to notify his dinner associates or the members of his committee.97
The dinners and committee meetings of 1907–1911 produced an “understand-
ing or moral obligation”98 rather than a “positive and expressed obligation,”99
93 United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 223 F. 55 (D.N.J. 1915), aff’d, 251 U.S. 417 (1920). See
Page, The Gary Dinners, supra note 6 (extended discussion of the Gary Dinners).
94 The decision was delayed because the Attorney General and the Chief Justice agreed to
suspend proceedings during World War I over U.S. Steel’s objection. Thomas K. Fisher, Anti-
trust During National Emergencies I, 40 MICH. L. REV. 969, 996–98 (1942).
95 U.S. Steel, 223 F. at 154.
96 Id. at 154 (quoting Charles M. Schwab) (emphasis added).
97 Id. at 174 (Woolley, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
98 Id. at 160 (Buffington, J.)
99 Id.
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yet stabilized prices as effectively as the “pools” of 1901–1904 and the “sta-
tistical associations” of 1904–1906 in the same industry. The Gary Dinners
suggest that rivals would be more likely to follow their statements of intention
when they are reinforced by behavioral factors like the sense of business eth-
ics Judge Gary promoted in his many speeches.100
The communications in the Gary Dinners episode resemble the communi-
cations in a hypothetical meeting of rivals that the Ninth Circuit imagined
fifty years later.101 In this scenario, five competitors meet; all but one an-
nounces its intention to set its price at $X; all or most subsequently set their
prices at $X.102 The court suggested that these statements of intention would
not establish a verbal agreement but might justify a finding of agreement if
combined with “evidence as to what these competitors had done before such
meeting, and what actions they took thereafter, or what actions they did not
take.”103 An agreement required only “mutual consent,” which could arise if a
rival proposed an action “in the presence of other competitors” and they fol-
lowed it “generally and customarily and continuously for all practical pur-
poses, even though there be slight variations.”104 Thus, mutual consent would
occur without “an exchange of assurances to take or refrain from a given
course of conduct.”105 This focus on communications also explains the courts’
dispositions of cases alleging price fixing in much more recent cases. Left
without adequate guidance by the Supreme Court, the lower courts have used
communication (or the inference of communication) as a crucial basis for dis-
100 Gary urged, for example, that
[i]f competitors are in frequent communication and make full disclosures to each other
in regard to their business, notifying one another of what they are doing, it will follow
as a natural result that no one will take advantage of the information he thus receives to
act unjustly or dishonorably towards his neighbor.
Def. Exhibit No. 61, Address of Mr. E.H. Gary at a meeting of the American Iron and Steel
Institute at Waldorf-Astoria, New York, Oct. 14, 1910, Transcript of Record on Appeal from the
District of New Jersey, vol. 2, at 252–53, United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S.
417 (1920).
101 Esco Corp. v. United States, 340 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1965).
102 Id. at 1007. Cf. MICHAEL D. WHINSTON, LECTURES ON ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 20 (2006)
(observing that the law distinguishes cases in which the parties merely state their intentions from
cases in which they communicate assent, but “economists have essentially nothing to say about
this”).
103 Esco, 340 F.2d at 1007.
104 Id. at 1008.
105 Id. at 1007–08. See also United States v. Beaver, 515 F.3d 730, 738 (7th Cir. 2008) (af-
firming convictions for criminal price fixing where defendants met at least three times, discussed
ways of stabilizing the market, and heard a proposal to limit discounts, which received tacit
assent).
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tinguishing concerted action from lawful tacit collusion, both at the pleading
stage106 and on motions for summary judgment.107
C. COMMUNICATIVE CONCERTED ACTION AND ERROR COSTS
As the previous discussion shows, the federal courts have rejected tacit col-
lusion as a species of agreement, yet do not insist on a completed verbal
agreement to satisfy Section 1; parallel action coordinated by communication
may be sufficient. This conclusion is consistent with the Chicago School’s
approach to antitrust rulemaking. A characteristic of the Chicago School ap-
proach is to evaluate rules in terms of their error costs: rules should be de-
signed to minimize the sum of the costs of false positives and false negatives
courts would likely create in the course of applying the rules.108 The definition
of concerted action I propose here would entail lower error costs than either a
narrower rule requiring a completed verbal agreement or a broader rule re-
quiring only tacit collusion.
Dennis Carlton, Robert Gertner, and Andrew Rosenfield usefully identify
and analyze the relevant considerations in an error cost analysis. They argue
that the per se prohibition of horizontal price fixing should be limited to prac-
tices that are “extremely” likely to have a purely anticompetitive effect and
that are sufficiently well defined that firms will know what they can and can-
not do.109 Those conditions are met, the authors argue, only by a “‘naked
cartel,’” in which “competitors meet to set price and to restrict aggregate out-
put and the meeting ends with an understanding of what each party is to do,
106 See, e.g., In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig., 630 F.3d 622, 628 (7th Cir. 2010) (uphold-
ing a complaint alleging that defendants “exchanged price information directly at association
meetings” and “met with each other in an elite ‘leadership council’ within the association—and
the leadership council’s stated mission was to urge its members to substitute ‘co-opetition’ for
‘competition’”) (Posner, J.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2165 (2011); In re Plasma-Derivative Pro-
tein Therapies Antitrust Litig., 764 F. Supp. 2d 991, 1002 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (upholding a com-
plaint in which plaintiffs alleged that the market was structured in a way that was conducive to
collusion and “that defendants met furtively during and after industry meetings to discuss price
and supply, and PPTA worked with defendants to create a system for monitoring production in
the industry”); In re Flash Memory Antitrust Litig., 643 F. Supp. 2d 1133, 1146–47 (N.D. Cal.
2009) (upholding a complaint based upon allegations that the defendants “exchanged highly
sensitive competitive information . . . and openly communicated with one another to ‘coordinate’
pricing,” where the complaint identified “when, where and who engaged in at least some of the
meetings”).
107 See, e.g., In re Ethylene Propylene Diene Monomer (EPDM) Antitrust Litig., 681 F. Supp.
2d 141, 176 (D. Conn. 2009) (observing that “by showing that the defendants shared pricing and
market information and indicated to each other whether they would lead or support price in-
creases, the plaintiffs have created an issue of fact that the defendants participated in a traditional
conspiracy to fix prices and allocate the American EPDM market”).
108 Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 15 (1984).
109 Carlton et al., supra note 90, at 427. The authors add that the per se rule should be limited to
instances in which “it is very difficult and costly to investigate claims of procompetitive versus
anticompetitive effect.” Id.
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and then each does what it promised.”110 In more ambiguous cases in which
“there is only evidence of mutual interdependence in pricing along with com-
munication such as public statements of industry-wide events,” the authors
argue, the per se rule is inappropriate. The concept of agreement should not be
the critical issue, they submit, because “‘agreement’ does not have a suffi-
ciently clear economic (or, in our view, even legal) meaning which allows one
to decide independent of the industry facts whether a particular form of com-
munication should be banned.”111 In these circumstances, the correct standard
is the rule of reason: “Using the per se sledgehammer to attack such commu-
nication without analysis of context or effect, by trying to label it an ‘illegal
agreement’” is unwise.112
The authors provide useful game theoretic analyses of the likely procompe-
titive and anticompetitive effects of different forms of communication. But
their proposed legal rule—assigning explicit cartels to the per se category and
other communicative practices to rule of reason—is problematic. First, the per
se category is underinclusive. It is also appropriate to infer per se unlawful
concerted action where rivals achieve consciously parallel, noncompetitive
price levels by communicating their intentions and mutual reliance about fu-
ture price. The rivals in the Gary Dinner system, for example, violated Section
1 by coordinating prices through statements of intention at committee meet-
ings, even though, on Judge Gary’s stern instructions, they studiously avoided
agreeing on anything. Firms that privately communicate their intentions about
future competitive choices, like pricing, are almost certainly not doing so for
reasons of efficiency; at least it seems no more likely than their forming a
cartel for reasons of efficiency, which is at least theoretically possible.113
Moreover, my proposed standard for communicative concerted action requires
that the defendants act consistently with their statements of intention, a con-
straint that serves a function similar to the rule of reason and thus reduces the
chance of false positives.
Moreover, Carlton, Gertner, and Rosenfield’s rule of reason category is
overinclusive and thus risks false positives. Eliding the threshold issue of
agreement to reach the ultimate issue of anticompetitive effect114 implicitly
expands the category of agreement. Rivals would apparently satisfy the agree-
110 Id. at 424.
111 Id.
112 Id. at 424–25.
113 Telser has shown that explicit price fixing may be efficient where firms with high fixed
costs face uncertain demand. See Telser, Cooperation, supra note 25, at 290.
114 The authors suggest that there is “no economic theory of the meaning of ‘agreement’
wherein one may determine easily when communication leads to anticompetitive results irrespec-
tive of the context of the events. Nor do we think this is the right problem to solve.” Carlton et
al., supra note 90, at 424.
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ment requirement of Section 1 whenever they acted interdependently and
communicated; the legality of the communication would then hinge on
whether the incremental effect of the communication was judged to be an-
ticompetitive in the circumstances. But, as Carlton et al. recognize, communi-
cation of one kind or another is ubiquitous in the modern economy.
Oligopolists would be exposed to antitrust challenges, albeit under the rule of
reason, whenever they communicated in a way that might affect their prices.
As Twombly recognized, the agreement requirement should have enough con-
tent to exclude from the Sherman Act certain categories of parallel behavior,
including some involving benign forms of communication.115 Rule of reason
treatment would be appropriate, for example, in cases like Container,116 in
which the Court inferred from the defendants’ practice of providing each
other with current price quotes upon request that the defendants had agreed to
follow that practice.
Under the same error cost criteria, as the courts have recognized, purely
tacit collusion should not be a Sherman Act agreement because such a rule
would yield too many false positives. Even if rivals can achieve noncompeti-
tive outcomes by purely tacit collusion, it does not follow that the law should
condemn this conduct. Antitrust law cannot proscribe all theoretically ineffi-
cient practices and should not attempt to do so. Its rules “must be administra-
tively workable and therefore cannot always take account of every complex
economic circumstance or qualification.”117
The experience of courts in examining the evidence offered for and against
hundreds of alleged conspiracies is relevant to the task of framing an adminis-
trable rule that is consistent with the policy of the Sherman Act.118 By their
115 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 567 n.12 (2007):
From the allegation that the ILECs belong to various trade associations . . . the dissent
playfully suggests that they conspired to restrain trade, an inference said to be “but-
tressed by the common sense of Adam Smith.” . . . If Adam Smith is peering down
today, he may be surprised to learn that his tongue-in-cheek remark would be authority
to force his famous pinmaker to devote financial and human capital to hire lawyers,
prepare for depositions, and otherwise fend off allegations of conspiracy; all this just
because he belonged to the same trade guild as one of his competitors when their pins
carried the same price tag.
116 United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333, 334–35 (1969).
117 Town of Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 22 (1st Cir. 1990) (Breyer, J.).
118 See also Randall David Marks, Can Conspiracy Theory Solve the “Oligopoly Problem,” 45
MD. L. REV. 387 (1986):
Courts have never explicitly required evidence of direct communication among the
defendant firms as part of plus factor analysis. Nevertheless, this author is aware of no
instance in which a price fixing agreement has been found without at least some direct
evidence of actual communication. Moreover, in only a few cases has an agreement
been inferred or implied with just minimal evidence of direct communication. Proof of
such communication may be a de facto requirement; at the very least, it strengthens the
case for liability considerably.
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dispositions of price-fixing cases, courts have implicitly found that a defini-
tion that includes tacit collusion would pose an unacceptable risk of false
positives. Ethyl, for example, refused to prohibit tacit collusion because many
of the facilitating devices that allowed firms to coordinate prices also created
efficiencies.119 If nothing else, the experience shows that, as a practical matter,
courts will only impose potentially enormous liabilities on firms that have
done something identifiably culpable, like communicating with rivals about
future prices and acting consistently with those communications.
My proposed communicative concerted action approach is also consistent
with economic analysis, which suggests that a focus on communication will
reach most stable anticompetitive arrangements and thus avoid most false
negatives. Although the game theoretic literature is inconclusive on the role of
communication in oligopoly behavior, it is helpful in framing the inquiry.120
Studies suggest that rivals can, under specified conditions, achieve multiple
collusive equilibria without communicating.121 Even so, they need some
mechanism to coordinate the selection of a single equilibrium—a process that
the equilibrium analysis alone cannot resolve.122 One survey of the literature,
for example, finds that collusion without communication is especially difficult
where firms are asymmetric in size and, therefore, no single joint profit-maxi-
mizing equilibrium exists; in that case “firms at least need to communicate in
order to make some agreement about which of the infinitely many equilibria
they are going to play,”123 particularly when they need to coordinate punish-
ments for noncooperative firms.
Id. at 409.
119 E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1984) (Ethyl), vacating Ethyl
Corp. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 101 F.T.C. 425 (1983).
120 Game theory has been criticized as a basis for antitrust policy because it does not yield the
sort of strong generalizations that can form the basis for a rule of liability. Franklin M. Fisher,
Games Economists Play: A Noncooperative View, 20 RAND J. ECON. 113, 120–23 (1989). In
the study of collusive oligopoly, however, use of game theory is squarely in the Chicago tradi-
tion. Indeed, economists studying coordination strategies uniformly pay homage to Stigler’s
pathbreaking study as the template for their work. Telser also formalized the issues of competi-
tion and collusion in terms of game theory. TELSER, supra note 27.
121 WHINSTON, supra note 102, at 46; Alexis Jaquemin & Margaret E. Slade, Cartels, Collu-
sion, and Horizontal Merger, in 1 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 415, 447–48
(Richard Schmalensee & Robert Willig eds., 1989); Marco A. Haan, Lambert Schoonbeek &
Barbara M. Winkel, Experimental Results on Collusion, in EXPERIMENTS AND COMPETITION POL-
ICY 9, 13 (Jeroen Hinloopen & Hans-Theo Normann eds., 2009) (stating that oligopolists may
achieve “collusive outcome[s]” by garnering profits “higher than the Nash equilibrium profits of
the stage game”). The authors define “perfect collusion as a situation in which firms manage to
maximize their joint profits.” Id. See also Charles A. Holt, Industrial Organization: A Survey of
Laboratory Research, in HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS (John H. Kagel & Alvin E.
Roth eds., 1997).
122 I am grateful to Joseph Harrington for this insight. See also Kaplow, Horizontal Agree-
ments, supra note 41, at 796.
123 Haan et al., supra note 121, at 14. The authors summarize that collusion is possible when
firms meet repeatedly but “becomes more difficult as the number of firms increases, as firms
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Experimental economics suggests that collusion without communication is
rare and dependent upon highly specific conditions.124 In both Cournot (out-
put-setting) and Bertrand (price-setting) experiments, imperfect collusion
without communication seems to be possible in duopolies but far less likely in
markets with three or more firms, in part, because punishment of defection
becomes more problematic.125 Direct communication increases the likelihood
of collusive outcomes in a variety of competitive contexts.126
While this literature suggests that failing to condemn tacit collusion will not
result in many false negatives, it does not identify what sorts of communica-
tions are sufficient for coordination. Experiments differ widely in the content,
frequency, and competitive contexts of the communications that the subjects
may make. The experiments suggest that the timing and content of communi-
cation matters. For example, pre-play threats, appeals to mutual self-interest,
and verbal punishments of cheating during renegotiation seem to be effec-
tive.127 Some experiments suggest that communication of intentions in a com-
mon language increases coordination, even if the communications take the
meet less often, or as firms observe each other’s behavior less often.” Id. at 15. Cf. Iwan Bos &
Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., Endogenous Cartel Formation with Heterogeneous Firms, 41 RAND
J. ECON. 92 (2010) (showing that large firms may form a stable cartel while smaller firms remain
outside of the cartel as a competitive fringe).
124 Haan et al., supra note 121; Robin M. Dawes & Richard H. Thaler, Cooperation, 2 J. ECON.
PERSP., Summer 1988, at 187, 193–95.
125 See, e.g., Holt, supra note 121, at 409 (summarizing the literature as finding that duopolies
are able to coordinate price, in part, because rivals can punish noncooperative behavior without
hurting cooperative rivals; above three participants, however, there is little evidence of a “pure-
numbers effect” in price coordination). But cf. Haan et al., supra note 121, at 21 (questioning
whether this result reflects real-world practices).
126 Holt, supra note 121, at 409 (describing prisoner’s dilemma and sealed-bid auction experi-
ments); id. at 411 (describing differentiated products experiments). See also Haan et al., supra
note 121, at 26 (summarizing the literature as suggesting that “in a repeated game the voluntary
sharing of information has a collusive effect, even though collusion is not the main reason that
firms choose to share information”); Miguel A. Fonseca & Hans-Theo Normann, Explicit vs.
Tacit Collusion—The Impact of Communication in Oligopoly Experiments 27 (July 3, 2011)
(unpublished manuscript) (finding that “medium-sized industries benefit the most from talking as
they are rather competitive without communication but are still able to maintain some collusion
by explicitly talking [while] duopolies have little to gain from talking as they already earn decent
profits without talking, and the large oligopolies gain less because they find it difficult to collude
successfully even with communication”), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab-
stract_id=1937803; Leslie, supra note 54, at 538 (summarizing the experimental literature as
suggesting “that allowing the players to communicate increases cooperation” by enhancing
trust). Leslie cites James P. Gahagan & James T. Tedeschi, Strategy and the Credibility of
Promises in the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game, 12 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 224, 226 (1968); Robin M.
Dawes et al., Behavior, Communication and Assumptions About Other People’s Behavior in a
Commons Dilemma Situation, 35 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1, 3 (1977).
127 David J. Cooper & Kai-Uwe Kuhn, Communication, Renegotiation, and the Scope for Col-
lusion (Jan. 2, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=1553429.
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form of cheap talk that does not affect the potential payoffs.128 The experi-
ments also indicate that behavioral factors that go beyond strict rationality
may play a role in the success and failure of collusion.129 Of course, the exper-
iments are highly stylized, and the participants are not businesses, so their
behavioral characteristics may be different from those of market actors.130
The economic literature on real-world cartels reveals that extensive com-
munications are necessary in successful cartels to prevent misunderstandings
and to resolve claims of cheating without triggering price wars.131 Of course, it
is evidence of communications that typically reveals the cartel; thus it may be
that durable tacit cartels exist unseen or unchallenged. But the fact that
cartelists choose to communicate and thus increase their risks of prosecution
suggests that communication is necessary or at least worth the risk in most
instances.132 In addition, Posner and most antitrust economists recognize (even
128 Harrington & Zhao, supra note 92, 20–21 (observing that experiments and real-world expe-
rience show that “[i]n practice, communication is essential to collusion” and that where commu-
nication is “used to resolve strategic uncertainty” and thus “to coordinate a move from a non-
collusive to a collusive equilibrium,” the rivals communicate “intentions rather than hard infor-
mation”). See also Vincent Crawford, A Survey of Experiments on Communication via Cheap
Talk, 78 J. ECON. THEORY 286, 287 (1998) (“Despite the intuition suggested by the saying ‘talk
is cheap,’ messages with no direct payoff implications can be informative when players’ prefer-
ences are not too far apart.”). When players communicate intentions, the effectiveness of com-
munication depends on the nature of the coordination problem, whether communications are one-
sided or two-sided and whether there are multiple rounds in which communication occurs. Id. at
294. Crawford surveys studies of experiments in a variety of settings posing coordination
problems. A recent study of price fixing finds that two players’ communication of their minimum
acceptable prices “appears critical to sustaining high prices” regardless of whether antitrust laws
apply and whether enforcers have adopted a leniency program. Maria Bigoni et al., Trust, Sali-
ence and Deterrence 17 (July 14, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.gi-
anca.org/PapersHomepage/TrustSalience&DeterrenceFinal(2010_07_14).pdf.
129 Cooper & Kuhn, supra note 127, at 37–38. In one experiment reported by Cooper and
Kuhn, player 2 cheated on verbal commitment in the first period; the following exchange ensued:
1: YOU MEANIE!!!!!!!!!!!
2: its in both our interests to choose [Period 2 High]
1: no
1: i wont help you
2: but you hurt yourself in the process
1: you already hurt me :(
In Period 2, Player 2 played High and Player 1 played Low.
130 One suspects that real-world efforts to collude would not be conducted in the language
reported in the preceding footnote, but similar emotions might come into play.
131 Leslie, supra note 54, at 579–81. See also David Genesove & Wallace P. Mullin, Rules,
Communication, and Collusion: Narrative Evidence from the Sugar Institute Case, 91 AM.
ECON. REV. 379, 386–89, 395–96 (2001) (showing the role of regular meetings through a trade
association in reinforcing the cartel).
132 Mariagiovanna Baccara & Heski Bar-Isaac, How to Organize Crime, 75 REV. ECON. STUD.
1039 (2008) (examining the trade-off that illegal organizations must make between the costs and
benefits of sharing information).
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if they cannot prove) that communications are usually necessary to maintain
noncompetitive pricing.133
III. APPLYING THE STANDARD: FACILITATING PRACTICES AND
COMMUNICATIVE CONCERTED ACTION
In this Part, I consider how public and private antitrust enforcers might
better discover when rivals have used communication as a means of concerted
action. The enforcement approach I recommend builds on Stigler’s theory of
the feasibility of collusion134 and Posner’s implementation and refinement of
that theory to formulate an approach consisting of both a legal definition of
collusion and practical means of discovering it. A focus on communication
should redirect enforcement measures aimed at cartels. The most relevant
communications are private and, therefore, difficult to prove without direct
evidence. Yet there are circumstances in which it should be possible to infer
communications from market structure and behavior, at least as a starting
point for investigation. Such a project will have implications for scholarship,
for public investigations, and for pleading and proof in private litigation.135 In
the remainder of this article, I will consider this issue in the context of facili-
tating practices.
If unlawful concerted action requires communication, investigators should
look for markets in which facilitating practices are effective only if combined
with separate, private communication. This undertaking involves a paradox.
Paolo Buccirossi observes that, in theory, there is “no reason to believe that
the probability of a facilitating practice conditioned to the existence of a con-
spiracy is higher or lower,” because firms may adopt the practice by agree-
ment in order to implement an explicit conspiracy or they may adopt the
practice by consciously parallel action in order to avoid the need for an ex-
plicit conspiracy.136 Thus, Buccirossi suggests, “the issue is whether,” in a
133 Jonathan B. Baker, Identifying Horizontal Price Fixing in the Electronic Marketplace, 65
ANTITRUST L.J. 41, 47–48 (1996); Kenneth G. Elzinga, New Developments on the Cartel Front,
29 ANTITRUST BULL. 3, 25 (1984); XAVIER VIVES, OLIGOPOLY PRICING: OLD IDEAS AND NEW
TOOLS 320–21 (1999); Gregory J. Werden, Economic Evidence on the Existence of Collusion:
Reconciling Antitrust Law with Oligopoly Theory, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 719, 763 (2004); WHIN-
STON, supra note 101, at 46.
134 As others have observed, “Stigler’s paper has been an inspiration and a building block for
the ensuing literature on cartels and collusion.” Robert H. Porter, Detecting Collusion, 26 REV.
INDUS. ORG. 147, 147 (2005).
135 Joseph Harrington notes that, “because of inadequacies in the underlying theory,” most
current econometric methods of detecting collusion cannot identify when rivals are “coordinating
their behavior through illegal means of communication” rather than by lawful tacit means. Jo-
seph E. Harrington, Detecting Cartels, in HANDBOOK OF ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 213, 216 (Paolo
Buccirossi ed., 2008). He suggests that future research should focus on the “identifying markers
of explicit collusion.” Id. 247.
136 Buccirossi, supra note 60, at 343.
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given case, “firms see facilitating practices and overt collusion as comple-
ments or substitutes,”137 an issue that can only be resolved empirically. As a
first approximation, however, I suggest that the more complex the practice
itself, the less likely the practice will be sufficient for coordination of prices
without additional communications. As the Supreme Court suggested in
Twombly, it may be proper to infer an agreement from “‘complex and histori-
cally unprecedented changes in pricing structure made at the very same time
by multiple competitors, and made for no other discernible reason.’”138 Thus,
investigators should be looking not at the markets most conducive to price
coordination, but at more complex and more competitively structured markets
in which firms have nevertheless managed to solve coordination problems
with facilitating practices.139
As a historical starting point, consider the Cement Institute case,140 in which
the Supreme Court affirmed the FTC’s determination that the cement indus-
try’s use of basing point pricing violated Section 5 of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act.141 The court of appeals in that case had reversed the FTC,
refusing, as the court put it, “to hold that the [multiple basing-point pricing]
system is illegal per se, and to require that cement be sold on an f.o.b. plant
137 Id.
138 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 n.4 (2007). See, e.g., In re Blood Reagents
Antitrust Litig., 756 F. Supp. 2d 623, 632 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (holding that “the triple-digit percent-
age increases in prices, closely aligned cancellations of contracts with group purchaser organiza-
tions, and substantially improved profit margins after 2000, constitute the sort of ‘complex and
historically unprecedented changes in pricing structure made at the very same time by multiple
competitors, and made for no other discernible reasons,’ that render an allegation of conspiracy
plausible”); Standard Iron Works v. ArcelorMittal, 639 F. Supp. 2d 877, 900 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (“It
is possible that the industry turnaround from fierce competition to striking coordination was the
inevitable result of industry consolidation, but the context, as a whole, provides enough to sup-
port the plausible conclusion that the cause of the turnaround was something other than consoli-
dation.”); In re OSB Antitrust Litig., No. 06-826, 2007 WL 2253419 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 3, 2007)
(holding that allegations of a pattern of announcements of output restrictions and price increases
created an inference of a conspiracy to coordinate prices through an industry publication and
trade meetings). But cf. In re LTL Shipping Serv. Antitrust Litig., No. 1:08-MD-01895, 2009
WL 323219, at *18 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 28, 2009) (dismissing a complaint that alleged only that “all
LTL service providers had the same incentives to charge the same shipping rates, and that over
time they eventually each did so”); In re Graphics Processing Units Antitrust Litig., 527 F. Supp.
2d 1011, 1022 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (holding that defendants’ price changes and product develop-
ment decisions were not “lockstep” or “historically unprecedented”). See also Kaplow, Horizon-
tal Agreements, supra note 41, at 740 n.143 (“[I]t would seem sufficient under Twombly, even
assuming a narrow agreement requirement, for a plaintiff to allege interdependent behavior plus
that the degree of conduciveness to collusion placed the case in the liability region rather than the
paradox region—that is, that the observed coordination would be unlikely or implausible given
the conditions of the industry unless the defendants had engaged in prohibited communica-
tions.”).
139 Cf. Harrington, Detecting Cartels, supra note 133, at 235 (“Explicit collusion may only
occur where collusion is difficult and thus collusive outcomes might be more competitive.”).
140 FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683 (1948).
141 15 U.S.C. § 45(a).
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basis.”142 The FTC argued in the Supreme Court, however, that it had con-
demned not basing-point pricing “as such,” but the “agreement to maintain
and implement the system and to eliminate price competition.”143 The FTC’s
record “disclosed in specific detail the collective action which had been taken
to implement and continue the system. And from all these facts, as well as the
existence of the system itself, the Commission found combination among re-
spondents to suppress price competition.”144 The Supreme Court agreed that
the FTC could reasonably have inferred an underlying agreement from vari-
ous efforts to police the system, even though there was little direct evidence of
communication among rivals.145 As one contemporary commentator observed:
As a practical matter, the maintenance of a rigid delivered price system over
any length of time requires some form of agreement among the producers.
Persistent standardization of the intricacies of freight charges, delivery meth-
ods, service extras and discounts is no easy task. Deliberately or unknow-
ingly, individual sellers will shade prices and prejudice the whole price
structure. If discipline or strong persuasion is necessary to keep errant pro-
ducers to a common price formula, the same discipline and a similar formula
would be necessary to make other forms of “price leadership” effective.146
Future enforcement efforts might focus on complex practices, like the one
at issue in Cement Institute, in which the use of facilitating practices to
achieve coordinated outcomes raises an inference that the rivals have also
communicated by means other than the facilitating practice itself. In markets
that meet this criterion, allegations of facts raising the inference of collusion
should be sufficient to satisfy Twombly’s pleading requirements,147 and evi-
dence of those facts should be sufficient to avoid summary judgment under
Matsushita.148 Discovery might reveal direct evidence of communications, but
that may not be necessary to create a jury issue.
142 Aetna Portland Cement Co. v. FTC, 157 F.2d 533, 573 (7th Cir. 1946), rev’d, 333 U.S. 683
(1948).
143 Brief for the Federal Trade Commission, at *122, FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683 (1948)
(Nos. 23-34), 1947 WL 55533.
144 Id. at *122–23.
145 See, e.g., Cement Institute., 333 U.S. at 714 (citing evidence of boycotts against “[d]ealers
who persisted in selling foreign cement” and efforts by Institute officials to “secur[e] pledges by
producers not to permit sales f.o.b. mill to purchasers who furnished their own trucks, a practice
regarded as seriously disruptive of the entire delivered price structure of the industry”). The
Court also pointed to unexplained, precisely identical bids by numerous rivals. Id. at 713 n.15.
146 Comment, Price Systems and Competition: The Basing-Point Issues, 58 YALE L.J. 426, 442
(1949).
147 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007).
148 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986) (“To survive a
motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict, a plaintiff seeking damages for a viola-
tion of § 1 must present evidence that tends to exclude the possibility that the alleged conspira-
tors acted independently.”) (internal quotations omitted).
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Given the variety of facilitating practices, as Buccirossi notes,149 it is impos-
sible, at this stage of our understanding, to generalize about the sorts of mar-
kets in which this condition will be met. But we can improve our ability to
identify these sorts of markets by examining a small but illuminating eco-
nomic literature on how facilitating practices have interacted with explicit
communications to produce collusive outcomes in actual antitrust cases.150
These studies use game theoretic models to predict when firms will be unable
to solve coordination problems using facilitating practices alone, and then ex-
amine how firms’ behavior during a known collusive period departed from
those predictions.151
Robert Marshall, Leslie Marx, and Matthew Raiff, for example, have stud-
ied the interaction of price announcements with explicit communications in
the international vitamin cartels. They “analyze[ ] price announcements dur-
ing a period of admitted explicit collusion” as a “window” onto cartel admin-
istration that is “observable, in real time, by both customers and law
enforcement.”152 On this basis, they suggest “how one might structure an em-
pirical investigation to determine the existence of explicit collusion based on
price announcement data” in industries with “high concentration, high entry
barriers, homogeneous products, and inelastic demand.”153
The authors observe that public price announcements enable a cartel to mit-
igate buyers’ resistance to price increases (by assuring the buyers that every-
one is facing the same increase) and to coordinate responses to resistance.154
They construct a game theoretic model to “account for how [price] announce-
ments facilitate collusion by increasing the likelihood that a cartel price in-
crease is ‘accepted’ by buyers.”155 The model suggests that, in the absence of
collusion, sellers never announce price changes simultaneously, and smaller
rivals never lead a joint price announcement. In the vitamin industry, price
announcements during the period before collusion apparently began were con-
sistent with this prediction, but during collusion there were many instances in
which smaller rivals led price increases.156
149 See Buccirossi, supra note 60.
150 See, e.g., Genesove & Mullin, supra note 131, at 383–85 (showing how the Sugar Insti-
tute’s rules functioned as facilitating practices by exposing cheating by members of a cartel).
151 These studies might provide the first volumes of “a library of cartels” that enforcers could
use “to empirically identify collusive markers.” Harrington, Detecting Cartels, supra note 135, at
252.
152 Robert C. Marshall, Leslie M. Marx & Matthew E. Raiff, Cartel Price Announcements: The
Vitamins Industry, 26 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 762, 763 (2008).
153 Id. at 764.
154 Id. at 766–67, 774.
155 Id. at 766.
156 Id. at 769–71. Cf. In re Pressure Sensitive Labelstock Antitrust Litig., 566 F. Supp. 2d 363,
372 (M.D. Pa. 2008) (holding that an allegation that a firm other than the usual price leader
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The model also suggests that, by making the announced prices effective in
the future, sellers are able to assess whether the price increase will stick and
thus maintain the agreed market shares without incurring the substantial costs
of redistributing cartel profits.157 In the vitamin industry, price announcements
during the cartel period differed from those during the competitive period in
ways that corresponded to the predicted function of price announcements in
coordinating price increases. For example, in the collusive period, the price
announcements were made well in advance and matched by rivals158 much
more frequently than in the competitive period. Moreover, the timing of the
announcements was correlated not with external cost increases but with the
amount of time since the last price announcement, a result consistent with trial
evidence that the cartel met quarterly.159
Zhongmin Wang’s examination of the record in an Australian prosecution
of a retail gasoline cartel also sheds light on the role of private communica-
tions and public price announcements in real-world collusion.160 Gasoline re-
tailing provides a familiar setting for hypothetical consciously parallel
pricing.161 Carlton, Gertner, and Rosenfield, for example, suggest that gas sta-
tions at a street corner in a remote town might be able to “coordinate a price
increase” simply by posting prices: one posts a higher price and the others
choose to match it, opting to maximize long-run profits at a noncompetitive
equilibrium.162 Wang suggests, however, that price behavior in real-world re-
tail gasoline markets follows a price cycle predicted in a well-known game
theoretic model of oligopoly.163 In the model, rivals cut prices until they reach
marginal cost, then fight a “war of attrition,” in which “[b]oth firms would
like price to be hiked, but neither would like to be the first to do so.”164 Two
firms may resolve the problem by “mixed strategies [i.e., ones with assigned
probabilities] within the cycle equilibrium.”165 More than two firms, however,
can only do so by consecutive price hikes that all firms maintain until the last
initiated a price increase immediately after a meeting at which the firms allegedly discussed
prices plausibly suggested agreement).
157 Marshall et al., supra note 152, at 773–74.
158 Id. at 781, 783, 782–83.
159 Id. at 782–86.
160 Zhongmin Wang, Collusive Communication and Pricing Coordination in a Retail Gasoline
Market, 32 REV. INDUS. ORG. 35 (2008).
161 See, e.g., Kaplow, Horizontal Agreements, supra note 41, at 692. Cf. White v. R.M. Packer
Co., 635 F.3d 571, 580–86 (1st Cir. 2011) (holding that plaintiffs’ evidence of noncompetitive
pricing by gas stations on Martha’s Vineyard failed to raise a jury issue of agreement).
162 Carlton et al., supra note 91, at 428–29.
163 Wang builds on Eric Maskin & Jean Tirole, A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, II: Price
Competition, Kinked Demand Curves and Edgeworth Cycles, 56 ECONOMETRICA 571 (1988).
Wang, supra note 160, at 38.
164 Wang, supra note 160, at 38.
165 Id. at 39.
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holdout acts, a condition that becomes less and less likely to be met as the
number of firms increases.166 After a successful price increase, the rivals grad-
ually undercut the price until they again reach the bottom of the cycle, and the
process begins again. Wang observes that the model suggests that in markets
with more than, say, three firms, rivals have an incentive to try to solve the
war of attrition problem and coordinate price hikes by adopting “facilitating
practices other than mixed strategies within the cycle equilibrium.”167 Those
practices, as Wang notes, may include direct communication.
Wang discovered that, in the Australian cartel, the rivals were often able to
coordinate significant sequential price increases with phone calls,168 despite
the presence in the market of a retailer that adopted a policy of always being
the last mover. Interestingly, the rivals used “notification” and repeated “fol-
low-up” calls as firms competed to be the last to increase price.169 If the at-
tempt failed, the rivals tried again several days later. If the attempt succeeded,
as predicted by the model, prices gradually declined by fractions of a cent
until the rivals determined that margins were “lower than acceptable,” at
which point the rivals would attempt another increase.170
A still more recent study of price fixing in retail gasoline markets also sug-
gests the power of communication as a means of coordinating price increases,
even where the market had several characteristics that made coordination dif-
ficult. Can Erutku and Vincent Hildebrand found that the announcement of an
antitrust investigation into retail gasoline pricing in Canada caused a modest
but significant decrease in the average price in the market.171 Wiretap evi-
dence in the investigation showed that cartel ringmasters were sometimes able
to coordinate price increases by phone calls and by checking posted prices
around town.172 These efforts were sometimes successful even though there
were sixty outlets in the market, entry was easy, and over fifty separate indi-
viduals participated in the phone calls.173
These results indicate that public or private enforcers should look for
changing patterns in the use of facilitating practices that suggest the use of
communication to resolve coordination problems. When changes accompany
price increases that are not correlated with observable cost or demand
166 Id. at 38–39.
167 Id. at 39.
168 Id. at 42–44. Even with communications, more than a third of the attempts failed because
one of the high-volume retailers did not match it. Id. at 43–44.
169 Id. at 46–49.
170 Id. at 43.
171 Can Erutku & Vincent A. Hildebrand, Conspiracy at the Pump, 53 J.L. & ECON. 223, 225
(2010).
172 Id. at 223–24.
173 Id. at 226–27.
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changes, the rivals may be using both communication and established facili-
tating practices to solve coordination and policing problems. In Cement Insti-
tute,174 the FTC emphasized the adoption of punitive basing points and other
parallel responses to noncooperative behavior. Marshall, Marx, and Raiff’s
analysis of the vitamin cartel data finds that changes in the frequency, timing,
leaders, regularity, effective dates, and success of price increase announce-
ments may be significant.175 Wang’s analysis of the Australian retail cartel
suggests that plaintiffs (in this instance, probably public enforcers) should
look for increased success in resolving the war of attrition among rivals at the
bottom of a cycle of price cuts unexplained by cost declines.176 Closer exami-
nation of price increases can focus on the sequence in which rivals accomplish
successful increases. By extension, plaintiffs should search for similar
changes in the use and success of other facilitating practices, like most-fa-
vored-customer-clauses, meeting competition clauses, or resale price mainte-
nance. Of course, more traditional sources of evidence may be equally
probative. The Canadian wiretap investigation that Erutku and Hildebrand ex-
amine started when one station owner who cut prices complained that his
rivals were threatening him.177
These recent studies also suggest a future role for game theory in identify-
ing suspicious pricing behavior. In two studies, game theory predicted that
facilitating practices alone were not enough to allow rivals fully to solve coor-
dination problems. In the Marshall, Marx, and Raiff study, the authors’ model
predicted that sellers would not announce price changes simultaneously and
smaller rivals would not lead a joint price announcement. The record in the
case revealed that behavior before the conspiracy period was consistent with
the model; only during the conspiracy period did the authors find the sugges-
tive patterns of joint price increases led by both small and large firms. In
Wang’s study also, the game theoretic model suggested that, in markets with
more than two or three rivals, firms would be unable to solve the war-of-
attrition paradox using only mixed strategies. The record in the case con-
firmed that communication was effective in solving the coordination problem.
More generally, these studies suggest that future scholarship should focus
on the weighting of and relationship among the factors that predispose mar-
kets toward collusion. The Erutku and Hildebrand study, for example, found
that the only Stiglerian factors favoring the success of the conspiracy were
price transparency, multimarket contacts among the sellers, and the presence
174 FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683 (1948).
175 Marshall et al., supra note 152.
176 Wang, supra note 160.
177 Id. at 223. See Porter, supra note 134, at 149 (describing complaints by various actors as
“time-honored method[s] of detecting collusion”).
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of a multitude of buyers each making small purchases.178 Under Stigler’s anal-
ysis, fifty rivals should not have been able to collude at all; nevertheless, they
were able to do so because of persistent, widespread communications. We still
do not know how many and what combinations of the Stiglerian factors are
necessary or sufficient for successful collusion with or without communica-
tion.179
IV. CONCLUSION
In his most recent scholarly discussion of the problem of oligopoly, Richard
Posner recognized that the “relation of competing firms in a concentrated
market is a natural to model in game-theoretic terms, and the literature that
does so is now immense.”180 Nevertheless, he suggested that “the models do
not yet yield implications that differ from those of non-game-theoretic ap-
proaches, notably that of George Stigler.”181 Posner, of course, derived his
analysis of tacit collusion from Stigler’s account of the conditions that make
collusion feasible. I have argued that the lessons of game theory, experimental
economics, real-world cartels, and dispositions of price-fixing cases over the
past four decades support refocusing the analysis and investigation of con-
certed action on the role of communication. I characterize this adaptation of
Posner’s approach as Neo-Chicago because it draws on these evolving bodies
of knowledge to estimate the costs of error that attend the available alternative
definitions of concerted action. The studies confirm what courts have recog-
nized—the central role of communication as a decisive marker of concerted
action in markets characterized by interdependent behavior. This approach
also suggests enforcers should look for unlawful concerted action, not in the
markets in which rivals coordinate prices with facilitating practices, but in
markets in which the evidence suggests that rivals are supplementing facilitat-
ing practices with communication.
178 Erutku & Hildebrand, supra note 171, at 228.
179 Id.
180 POSNER, supra note 41, at 59.
181 Id. at 59–60.
